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My aim in this article is to raise a question of what kind of harm we Japanese actually 
suffered from radiation caused by the serious nuclear power plants’ accident in 
Fukushima happening as a result of the 3.11 disaster that struck Japan in 2011, and 
examine the significance of applying the precautionary principle to this particular case 
of 3.11. I only focus upon problems about how exposure to radiation in this case could 
affect human health, completely independent of the complicated (sometimes even 
political) issue of whether we should keep the nuclear power plants system or not.  
There are three possible answers to that question of what kind of harm we Japanese 
actually suffered from radiation after the 3.11. First, the very fact that radioactive 
matters are emitted is nothing but harm we suffered. However, we have to notice the 
conceptual difference between accident and harm. Accidents could happen even if no 
human being exists there, whereas the concept of harm must be related to humans. An 
unmanned space satellite could be involved in an accident, but it gives no direct harm to 
anybody. In this respect the emission itself of radioactive matters is definitely just an 
accident, which shouldn’t be regarded as harm. Rather it must be the cause of harm. 
Second, many people are actually exposed to additional doses of radiation by nuclear 
plants accident in comparison to normal situation, so this additional exposure to 
radiation must be the very harm we suffer. This answer sounds reasonable, because it is 
scientifically true that radiation like α-ray, β-ray, or γ-ray physically hits our body and 
ionizes our body’s molecules. That is to say, radiation somehow changes biological 
conditions of our physical body. Then, can we say that this is the very core of harm in 
this case? Probably it is hard to say so. Some points should be noticed. Initially we 
should recognize, as a matter of fact, that doses of radiation exposure, internally and 
externally, even in the case of people living in Fukushima, is quite low; more than 90% 
of them externally suffered less than 5mSv of radiation in total, and internally 0.16mSv 
at maximum, according to publicly announced information. Should we judge that this 
low dose of radiation exposure will seriously affect our human body to cause more 
cancer death or leukemia death than usual?  Considering the data about the history of 
human’s radiation exposure, it is not necessary to judge so. In this context, we also have 
to confirm that the problem we should focus upon is not whether we are exposed to 
additional radiation or not, but how the radiation exposure affects our health. It is one 
thing to be exposed to radiation, but it is another thing to have cancer to die because of 
that additional radiation exposure.  Furthermore, we should recognize that radiation 
exposure is not unusual in our normal lives. The world is always full of radiation, so 
that it is impossible for us to suffer no radiation exposure at all. Additional radiation 
exposure is not unusual either, particularly to the extent of doses corresponding to the 
Fukushima’s case. We are exposed to additional radiation, even apart from radiation 
exposure in medicine, for instance, in climbing mountains, using gas-mantles at 
camping, or drinking hot spring, and so on.  
The third possible answer is that; many people evacuated from areas close to the 
Fukushima nuclear power plants have been already involved in some kinds of serious 
hardship; many elderly people died in the process of evacuation, more people 
committed suicide than usual in the temporary shelters, some families were evacuated 
separately from their family members, agricultural products in Fukushima were hated 
despite being certificated to be not dangerous, children who were evacuated from 
Fukushima to other prefectures were discriminated, and so on. It is absolutely true that 
this is the real harm people have actually suffered, so it is strongly required in many 
senses to resolve the harm as quickly as possible. However, what should be confirmed 
here is the clear cut distinction between two kinds of harm, namely, the harm by 
radiation exposure and the harm by avoiding radiation exposure.  Obviously harm 
accompanied by the process of evacuation must be classified as the harm by avoiding 
radiation exposure rather than that by radiation exposure itself. However, my original 
question, which seems to be what people are most seriously anxious about, is ‘what 
kind of harm we Japanese actually suffered from radiation’. In this respect, harm 
accompanied by the process of evacuation couldn’t be an appropriate answer to my 
question. Thus, we fall into bewilderment.   
In addition, we must admit that there are intrinsic uncertainties about this issue. 
First of all, there is uncertainty with regard to how to measure doses of radiation 
exposure. It is unavoidable for something guessed to be included. Furthermore, ‘sievert’ 
as a unit of radiation exposure is essentially uncertain, as the unit is empirically 
established so that it is changeable as science progresses.  Moreover, a causal relation 
between low doses of radiation exposure and cancer death, which is the very crux of the 
matter, is intrinsically probabilistic and uncertain. At least, the causation is far from 
being necessary without exceptions.  
Lastly, I explore the significance of the strategy of applying the precautionary 
principle (PR) to the case of Fukushima nuclear power plants accident. Many people 
insisted this strategy just after the accident. Generally, there are two kinds of PR; the 
strong one and the weak one. In a word, the strong PR asserts that everything should be 
avoided if the thing has non-zero probability to cause troubles, whereas the weak one 
claims that, as to any threats of irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as an excuse to postponing cost effective measure to prevent damage. 
The strong PR is eventually nonsensical, as, adopting that, we mustn’t try any scientific 
developments. The weak PR is also hard to accept instantly, because we must consider 
countervailing risks which is caused by applying the weak PR to avoid radiation 
exposure (that is called target risks in contrast to countervailing risks). Those hardships 
accompanied by evacuation that I mentioned above are nothing but a representation of 
countervailing risks in this case. Also it is doubtful whether the Fukushima accident 
should be regarded as irreversible damage or not.   
In any case, we shouldn’t require zero-risks, as that requirement rather causes other 
countervailing risks that threaten human lives. Phenomena of risks are somehow similar 
to the principle of the conservation of energy.  If risks in one part were reduced, risks 
in other parts could be increased. We should always take those conditions into account 
to make better decisions. That’s our life. We must recognize that we are always facing 
death, as Japanese samurais were once taught. That attitude leads to a noble way of 
living.  
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